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THE INTEGRITY OF DELAWARE’S CORPORATE DISSOLUTION 
STATUTE AFTER TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN 
ISLANDS V. GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO.: IS EXTENDED POST-
DISSOLUTION SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY A NECESSARY 
COMPONENT OF DELAWARE’S CORPORATE DISSOLUTION 
SCHEME? 
INTRODUCTION 
The possibility of corporate dissolution creates both an incentive for 
opportunistic corporations to avoid future liability and a corresponding risk of 
non-compensable harm for consumers and the general public.1  This is 
especially true in the area of products liability and environmental 
contamination, where a company’s products or manufacturing activities may 
inflict harm many years after the entity has dissolved and distributed its assets.2  
 
 1. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman note: 
  The second factor that can exacerbate inefficient incentives under limited liability is 
the shareholder’s option to liquidate the corporation and distribute its assets before tort 
liability attaches.  Since products and manufacturing processes often create long-term 
hazards that become visible only after many years, firms can—and often do—liquidate 
long before they can be sued by their tort victims. 
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1884 (1991); 
see also Mark R. Sarlitto, Note, Recognizing Products Liability Claims at Dissolution: The 
Compatibility of Corporate and Tort Law Principles, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1062–63 (1987) 
(“Dissolution law shifts the fixed costs of claim uncertainty away from the firm and its 
shareholders to a class of anonymous and dispersed consumers.  The possibility of this shift 
creates the dissolution incentive.”). 
 2. One commenter notes: 
Since a products liability claim is often contingent upon a showing that an individual 
sustained an injury from a defective product, many products liability claimants have no 
claim against the corporation at the time of dissolution.  When the cause of action does 
accrue, the claimants may then find the dissolved corporation immune from suit. 
Rosemary Reger Schnall, Comment, Extending Protection to Foreseeable Future Claimants 
Through Delaware’s Innovative Corporate Dissolution Scheme—In re Rego Co., 19 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 141, 146 (1994).  Based on an analysis of insurance industry statistics, Mr. Sarlitto has 
also noted the delayed accrual of products liability claims and the problem corporate dissolution 
poses for recovery of such claims: 
  Insurance industry statistics, however, suggest that only thirty percent of expected 
general liability claims (which include products liability) are reported three years after the 
initial policy year and only sixty percent are reported after the eighth year.  Not until 
thirteen years after the initial policy year are seventy-five percent of the losses known to 
the insurer.  The balance of these losses develop over the next two decades.  These 
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To eliminate this “dissolution incentive,”3 most states have enacted statutory 
schemes that regulate corporate dissolution and impose varying degrees of 
liability upon both directors and shareholders.4 
In the late 1980s, the State of Delaware developed a statutory scheme, then 
revolutionary, that sought to balance the competing policy concerns of 
corporate and tort law.5  While revised since its inception, Delaware’s 
dissolution scheme is still predicated upon two competing, but not 
irreconcilable, policy concerns: 1) the expeditious distribution of corporate 
assets in a manner that facilitates their subsequent beneficial utilization; and 2) 
the protection of corporate creditors and claimants.6  Based on these policy 
concerns, Delaware’s statutory scheme provides corporate directors with a 
choice between either formal, judicially supervised wind-up procedures or 
informal, extrajudicial wind-up procedures.7  Generally, judicially supervised 
wind-up provides both directors and shareholders greater insulation from 
liability and affords shareholders greater security for liquidation distributions.8  
In addition, judicially supervised dissolution provides corporate creditors and 
claimants—known, contingent, and unknown but foreseeable—with a greater 
degree of protection than extrajudicial dissolution.9  Thus, judicially supervised 
dissolution, while costly, efficiently satisfies the competing policy concerns 
underlying Delaware’s statutory scheme.10  Extrajudicial corporate dissolution, 
 
statistics suggest that a substantial proportion of products liability claimants are precluded 
from recovery by a five-year abatement period. 
Sarlitto, supra note 1, at 1052 (citing REINSURANCE ASS’N OF AM., LOSS DEVELOPMENT STUDY 
(5th ed. 1985)); see also Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at 
Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 1, 73 (1995) (“The most common scenario implicating future unknown claims is that of delay-
occurrence products liability injuries that are not only foreseeable to a dissolving firm at the time 
of its death but which also provide the sole impetus for the corporation’s dissolution.”). 
 3. Sarlitto, supra note 1, at 1063. 
 4. For a list of corporate dissolution statutes by state, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.07 
cmt. at 14-69–70 (2008). 
 5. Stilson, supra note 2, at 75–76 (“Only Delaware and Florida have statutes which have 
ostensibly been ‘tort’ reformed to address the academic proposals of tort modifications within 
dissolution statutes.”) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 280–282 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
607.1406 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994)); see also Schnall, supra note 2, at 149 (“The recently 
enacted provisions of sections 280 through 282 of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
provide a novel alternative mechanism governing dissolution which addresses the needs of both 
claimants with late-maturing products liability claims, and shareholders who receive a 
distribution of the dissolved corporation’s assets.”). 
 6. See In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92, 96–97 (Del. Ch. 1992); Schnall, supra note 2, at 149. 
 7. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 280–281 (2009). 
 8. Schnall, supra note 2, at 168; see Sarlitto, supra note 1, at 1062 (arguing that the 
dissolution provisions shift the risk from the company to the company’s past customers). 
 9. Schnall, supra note 2, at 167–68. 
 10. Id. at 175. 
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on the other hand, fails to adequately satisfy policy concerns—i.e., protection 
of corporate creditors or facilitation of corporate asset distribution—in 
situations where corporations have potential future liability.11 
Elective corporate dissolution under judicial scrutiny is, given the 
possibility of future liability, the optimum method of corporate dissolution.  
However, in Territory of the United States Virgin Islands v. Goldman, Sachs & 
Co., the Delaware Court of Chancery interpreted Delaware’s dissolution statute 
as providing shareholders the same degree of protection from future liability 
regardless of whether the corporation winds up its affairs extrajudicially or 
under judicial scrutiny.12  This raises the question of whether temporally 
extended shareholder liability for post-dissolution corporate distributions is a 
necessary element of Delaware’s statutory scheme.  More broadly, Goldman 
Sachs questions the utility of post-dissolution shareholder liability as an 
element of a state’s corporate dissolution scheme in general.  Given 
Delaware’s preeminent status as a state of incorporation,13 the broad reach and 
influence of its Court of Chancery,14 and the comparatively unique nature of its 
 
 11. See id. at 168–69 (noting that the default provisions fail to safeguard the rights of future 
claimants and do not give shareholders the same finality and certainty as the elective provisions). 
 12. 937 A.2d 760, 798–800 (Del. Ch. 2007), aff’d, 956 A.2d 32 (Del. 2008). 
 13. A leading treatise on Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) observed: 
  By any measure, Delaware is the preeminent state in corporation law.  Over 40 
percent of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange are incorporated in 
Delaware. A majority of the publicly traded Fortune 500 companies are Delaware 
corporations.  More than 80 percent of the companies that have reincorporated during the 
past quarter century have migrated to Delaware.  Legal pronouncements by Delaware 
courts are watched in the financial capitals of the world. 
Leo Herzel & Laura D. Richman, Delaware’s Preeminence By Design, Foreword to 1 R. 
FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS F-1 (3d ed., supp. 2001) (footnotes omitted); see also JEFFREY W. 
BULLOCK, DEL. DIV. CORPS., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2009) (“Despite the worldwide 
economic decline and its effect on new business formations, Delaware remained the chosen home 
of 64% of Fortune 500 companies . . . .  At the end of 2008, there were over 882,000 active 
business entities in Delaware—an overall increase of 4.1% over the previous year.”). 
 14. In their comparison of DGCL with the Model Business Corporation Act, Michael P. 
Dooley and Michael D. Goldman noted the importance of Delaware’s judicial decisions involving 
corporate law: 
The influence of the Delaware judiciary cannot be overstated. Corporation law students 
are fed a heavy, nearly exclusive diet of opinions from the Delaware Court of Chancery 
and the Supreme Court of Delaware, and this learning carries over to their post-graduation 
careers in practice.  In transactions or disputes involving firms incorporated elsewhere, 
lawyers regularly look to Delaware case law for guidance if there is no binding precedent 
or controlling statute in the relevant state of incorporation. 
Michael P. Dooley & Michael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons Between the Model Business 
Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 737, 738 (2001). 
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statutory dissolution scheme,15 this Comment will primarily focus on Delaware 
law.  Specifically, this Comment will discuss the viability of exposing 
shareholders to extended post-dissolution liability as a means of deterring 
corporate liability-avoidance by dissolution. 
Under the current law after Goldman Sachs, shareholders lack an incentive 
to initiate or approve of formal dissolution—they are equally protected from 
post-dissolution liability regardless of the method of wind-up the corporation 
employs.16  Moreover, given the increased cost of formal dissolution and its 
potential to diminish shareholder liquidation distributions, shareholders may 
actually have an incentive to initiate or approve extrajudicial dissolution as a 
means of avoiding future liabilities.  To further complicate matters, Goldman 
Sachs articulates a strong policy preference among the Delaware Court of 
Chancery for temporally limited post-dissolution shareholder liability.17  The 
chancery court’s decision in Goldman Sachs thus threatens to undermine the 
balance of competing policy concerns underlying Delaware’s statutory 
dissolution scheme.  In order to preserve the flexibility and security offered to 
directors and shareholders while simultaneously protecting the interests of 
corporate claimants at dissolution, Delaware courts must take several steps to 
modify the law governing corporate dissolution.  To reestablish the balance 
between corporate and tort law policy concerns regarding corporate dissolution 
after Goldman Sachs, the Delaware Court of Chancery should employ three 
measures: 1) limit the power to choose the method of corporate dissolution 
solely to directors; 2) impose an implied statutory duty upon such directors to 
make reasonable provisions for future claims if they elect extrajudicial wind-
up; and 3) utilize the doctrine of successor liability18 when necessary to avoid 
pre-dissolution asset liquidation.  By employing these measures, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery can protect corporate shareholders from temporally-
indeterminate post-dissolution liability while simultaneously protecting the 
interests of present and future tort claimants.  These measures would also allow 
the Court of Chancery to ensure that corporations with the potential for future 
liability will utilize the formal wind-up procedures.  This, in turn, will provide 
 
 15. Schnall, supra note 2, at 175 (“Delaware’s alternative statutory mechanism for voluntary 
dissolution is the first of its kind to address the problem of post-dissolution products liability 
claims by mandating that reasonable provisions be made for foreseeable, unknown future 
claimants.”). 
 16. See Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 764. 
 17. See id. at 792–97. 
 18. Under the doctrine of successor liability, Delaware courts may, where “avoidance of 
liability would be unjust,” impose liability upon the transferee of “all or substantially all” of a 
transferor’s assets.  See Ross v. Desa Holdings Corp., No. 05C-05-013, 2008 WL 4899226, at *4 
(Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2008).  Situations where this liability may arise include: “1) the buyer’s 
[contractual] assumption of liability; 2) de facto merger or consolidation; 3) mere continuation of 
the predecessor [corporation] under a different name; or 4) fraud.”  Id. 
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greater protection for corporate claimants insofar as the formal wind-up 
procedures provide for judicial supervision of corporate dissolution and the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of future corporate 
claimants.19  Employing these measures will restore the delicate balance 
between corporate and tort law policy concerns regarding corporate 
dissolution. 
This Comment will first track the historical development of the law 
governing corporate dissolution.  A brief, historical analysis of corporate 
dissolution under the common law will provide a proper context within which 
Delaware’s modern statutory dissolution scheme may be assessed.  Next, this 
Comment will summarize the operation of Delaware’s statutory dissolution 
scheme and the manner in which it balances corporate and tort law policy 
concerns.  Then, the Comment will discuss the Goldman Sachs decision and its 
implications for the integrity of Delaware’s statutory dissolution scheme.  
Finally, this Comment will conclude with several recommendations for a 
change in the law that will enable Delaware to preserve the integrity of its 
dissolution scheme while simultaneously protecting shareholders from 
temporally indeterminate post-dissolution liability. 
I.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING CORPORATE 
DISSOLUTION 
A. Common Law Corporate Dissolution 
Early common law viewed the corporation as a distinct legal entity, 
roughly analogous to an individual human being.  Under early English 
common law, the corporation, or corpora corporata, was considered an 
“artificial person” composed of, yet distinct from, its constituent members.20  
When individuals united into a corporate entity to achieve various ends—
whether religious, educational, or commercial—such persons and their 
successors were considered “one person in law.”21 
Early American common law also reified the corporation.  In Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward,22 Chief Justice Marshall described the 
corporation as a distinct entity possessing individual characteristics: 
 A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it . . . .  Among the 
most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, 
 
 19. Schnall, supra note 2, at 167–68 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 280(c) (2008)). 
 20. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *467–68. 
 21. Id. at *468. 
 22. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
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individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are 
considered as the same, and may act as a single individual.23 
Thus, at common law, the corporation was a discrete, legally-cognizable 
entity of potentially eternal existence.  As such, it was legally distinguishable 
from its constituent members and capable of acting in its own capacity.  This 
conception of the corporation had important implications for the law regarding 
corporate dissolution. 
While recognizing the ability of a corporation to exist perpetually, both 
Blackstone and American common law also acknowledged the reality of 
corporate dissolution.  Perhaps following his initial analogy to its logical 
conclusion, Blackstone described the dissolution of a corporation as its “civil 
death.”24  In Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, Chief Justice Taft 
rendered this analogy more explicit: “It is well settled that at common law . . . 
a corporation which has been dissolved is as if it did not exist, and the result of 
the dissolution cannot be distinguished from the death of a natural person in its 
effect.”25  In accordance with this analogy, dissolution of the corporation at 
common law immediately terminated all claims by and against the corporate 
entity.26  The corporation itself ceased to exist, and was therefore incapable of 
sustaining suits of any kind.27  Moreover, the constituent members of the 
corporation—both directors and shareholders—were entirely protected from 
any liability after corporate dissolution.28  Chief Justice Taft noted that “as the 
death of the natural person abates all pending litigation to which such a person 
is a party, dissolution of a corporation at common law, abates all litigation in 
which the corporation is appearing either as plaintiff or defendant.”29  Thus, at 
early common law, the dissolution of the corporation left all claimants without 
remedy and all corporate members without liability.30  While simplistic in its 
operation,31 this rule created a notable incentive for dissolution; corporate 
 
 23. Id. at 636. 
 24. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *484 (“The grant is indeed only during the life of the 
corporation; which may endure for ever: but, when that life is determined by the dissolution of the 
body politic, the grantor takes it back by reversion, as in the case of every other grant for life.”). 
 25. 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1927). 
 26. See In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92, 95 (Del. Ch. 1992) (citing, inter alia, Okla. Natural 
Gas Co., 273 U.S. at 259). 
 27. Pac. Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Cal. 1988) (en banc). 
 28. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *484 (“The debts of a corporation, either to or from it, 
are totally extinguished by it’s [sic] dissolution; so that the members thereof cannot recover, or be 
charged with them, in their natural capacities.”). 
 29. Okla. Natural Gas Co., 273 U.S. at 259. 
 30. In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d at 95 (“At an early stage of our law . . . [c]orporate dissolution 
thus stood as a substantial risk to corporate creditors, threatening to deprive them of a party to sue 
on their claims.”). 
 31. See Joseph Jude Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors upon 
Dissolution: Nature and Implications of the “Trust Fund” Doctrine of Corporate Assets, 30 BUS. 
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directors or shareholders were able to dissolve a corporate entity, distribute its 
assets, and avoid any pending or future claims with impunity.32 
B. Historical Overview of the Trust Fund Doctrine 
To “ameliorate the harsh effects of th[e] common law,” American courts 
eventually fashioned the amorphous “trust fund doctrine.”33  Somewhat 
ambiguous in nature,34 the doctrine emerged as an equitable remedy that 
enabled creditors to recover against shareholders after corporate dissolution if 
the corporation improperly distributed its assets to shareholders rather than 
unsatisfied creditors.35  Initially, the doctrine enabled creditors to pursue 
dissolution distributions into the hands of shareholders on the theory that an 
equitable lien or constructive trust attached to the distributed property in favor 
of corporate creditors.36  This judicial notion of a constructive trust also gave 
rise to the fiduciary duties of directors during dissolution.37  As the doctrine 
developed, courts began characterizing directors during corporate dissolution 
as trustees—legally obligated to administer corporate assets in favor of 
creditors and stockholders.38  A brief historical summary of the trust fund 
doctrine will establish a helpful context for an analysis of Delaware’s 
contemporary dissolution statute. 
 
LAW. 1061, 1061 (1975); see also In re RegO, 623 A.2d at 95 (“At an early stage of our law, that 
law was clear, if harsh.”). 
 32. Stilson, supra note 2, at 67; see also In re RegO, 623 A.2d at 95 (“Corporate dissolution 
thus stood as a substantial risk to corporate creditors, threatening to deprive them of a party to sue 
on their claims.”). 
 33. Pac. Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Cal. 1988) (en banc); In re 
RegO, 623 A.2d at 95; Blankenship v. Demmler Mfg. Co., 411 N.E.2d 1153, 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1980). 
 34. Norton, supra note 31, at 1067 (“‘Just what the doctrine is, even those who uphold it do 
not seem to know.  It seems to be an accommodating judicial ignis fatuus, which is present or 
absent as courts seem to require.  No court has been able to describe it exactly or to define its 
limits.’”) (quoting Note, The “Trust Fund” Theory, 9 HARV. L. REV. 481, 482 (1896)); 15A 
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 7360, at 48 (West perm. ed., rev. vol. 2009) (1917) (“Perhaps no concept has 
created as much confusion in the field of corporate law as has the ‘trust fund doctrine.’”). 
 35. See Koch v. United States, 138 F.2d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1943); Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. 
Cas. 435, 436–37 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944). 
 36. Koch, 138 F.2d at 852; Wood, 30 F. Cas. at 436–37; 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 
2419, at 515 (2009). 
 37. See, e.g., Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 260 (1927) (citing OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 34, § 5361 (1921)); see also Stilson, supra note 2, at 90 (acknowledging that 
inconsistent application of corporate law across different states can cause confusion about 
managerial duties, especially to creditors). 
 38. See, e.g., Okla. Natural Gas Co., 273 U.S. at 260. 
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The trust fund doctrine first emerged in early nineteenth century American 
Jurisprudence with Justice Story’s opinion in Wood v. Dummer.39  Justice 
Story, sitting circuit, reviewed whether bank shareholders who received 
dividend distributions prior to insolvency were liable for the outstanding debts 
of the dissolved bank.40  The defendant shareholders had authorized substantial 
distributions despite the existence of outstanding banknotes.41  The holders of 
the notes filed suit against the shareholders, alleging fraudulent division of the 
bank’s capital stock.42  However, the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence 
of fraud.43  Thus, according to Justice Story, the plaintiffs could only recover 
based on the fact that defendant shareholders possessed the bank’s distributed 
capital.44  Justice Story ultimately held the defendant shareholders liable for 
the outstanding debts of the bank in accordance with their respective shares of 
capital stock.45 His articulation of the basis for relief predicated subsequent 
development of the trust fund doctrine: 
[T]he charters of our banks make the capital stock a trust fund for the payment 
of all the debts of the corporation. The bill-holders and other creditors have the 
first claims upon it; and the stockholders have no rights, until all the other 
creditors are satisfied. . . . 
. . . If the capital stock is a trust fund, then it may be followed by the creditors 
into the hands of any persons, having notice of the trust attaching to it. As to 
the stockholders themselves, there can be no pretence to say, that, both in law 
and fact, they are not affected with the most ample notice.46 
While critics have suggested that this basis of relief was unnecessary and 
vague,47 Wood provided a foundation for further judicial application of the 
trust fund theory.  After Wood, it became possible for an “equitable charge,”—
be it a constructive trust or equitable lien—to attach to corporate distributions 
 
 39. Wood, 30 F. Cas. at 436–37; see also Norton, supra note 31, at 1062 (noting that the 
trust fund doctrine was not an essential holding of Wood but that the doctrine was applied 
uncritically afterwards). 
 40. Wood, 30 F. Cas. at 436. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 438. 
 45. Wood, 30 F. Cas. at 440. 
 46. Id. at 436–37. 
 47. See, e.g., Norton, supra note 31, at 1062–67 (arguing that Justice Story looked for 
broader equitable principles to justify his decision because the plaintiff’s complaint was poorly 
drafted); Stilson, supra note 2, at 79–81 (pointing out three unfortunate aspects of Justice Story’s 
opinion: 1) It was not required to decide the case; 2) It created an ambiguous doctrine with poorly 
defined limits; and 3) It distorted basic corporate law). 
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in favor of unpaid creditors.48  This provided creditors and other claimants with 
a viable basis for ex post recovery against the shareholders of a dissolved 
corporation. 
In the century succeeding Wood, courts continued to apply and even 
expand upon the trust fund doctrine as a means of post-dissolution recovery 
against shareholders.49  In Koch v. United States, the Tenth Circuit, capitalizing 
upon the notion of an implied trust, expansively defined the doctrine: 
 Where the assets of a dissolved corporation have been distributed among the 
stockholders, a creditor of the dissolved corporation may follow such assets as 
in the nature of a trust fund into the hands of stockholders. . . .  Where the trust 
property has been used by the stockholder for his own purpose, or disposed of 
by him, he may be held personally liable for the full value thereof.50 
In addition, courts also imposed equitable duties on directors during 
corporate dissolution, further expanding the trust fund doctrine.51  In 
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., Chief Justice Taft, interpreting Oklahoma law, 
expanded upon the notion of a constructive trust imposed upon corporate assets 
and stated that the directors and managers of a dissolved corporation were 
“trustees of the creditors and stockholders.”52  As such, corporate directors had 
a fiduciary duty to administer corporate assets in favor of creditors and 
stockholders.53  Unsatisfied creditors possessed a claim to corporate assets 
superior to that of stockholders at dissolution.54  If directors breached their 
duty to creditors by wrongfully distributing corporate assets to shareholders 
before creditors at dissolution, the directors could be personally liable.55 
Thus, by the middle of the twentieth century, the law governing corporate 
dissolution had developed into a convoluted web of equitable trusts, liens, and 
fiduciary duties.  Reacting to the simplistic yet harsh effects of the common-
law rule of no post-dissolution liability, judges crafted equitable solutions to 
 
 48. See Norton, supra note 31, at 1071, 1067–72 (critically examining the trust fund doctrine 
to determine the nature of the equitable remedy courts employed (i.e., a constructive trust or 
equitable lien)). 
 49. 15A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 34, § 7369 (“[T]he doctrine has given rise to a system 
of legal rules, and the decisions stating the principle, either directly or by implication, also state 
the effect of collateral principles involved.”). 
 50. 138 F.2d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1943) (footnote omitted). 
 51. In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92, 95 (Del. Ch. 1992) (footnote omitted) (“While in some of 
its aspects the trust fund doctrine has had a varied history, its central concepts have been widely 
acknowledged. Those core concepts are that on dissolution corporate directors have obligations to 
creditors . . . .”); Stilson, supra note 2, at 90 (“[I]t is irrefutable that equity gave birth to the 
doctrine which first announced the directorial duty to creditors.”). 
 52. Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 260 (1927) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 
34, § 5361 (1921)). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436–37 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944). 
 55. 15A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 34, § 7369. 
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remedy the problems inherent in corporate dissolution under an all-
encompassing “trust fund doctrine.”  While the doctrine has been criticized for 
its ambiguity,56 two broad rules governing the duties and liabilities of directors 
and shareholders at dissolution have emerged in the case law of various 
jurisdictions.  First, corporate directors serve as fiduciaries charged with the 
administration of corporate assets in favor of both creditors and shareholders.57  
Second, an “equitable charge”58 attaches to corporate assets in favor of 
creditors, thereby enabling creditors to pursue these assets into the hands of 
recipient shareholders.59 
C. Modern Statutory Dissolution Schemes 
Perhaps due to the ambiguity inherent in the trust fund doctrine, many state 
legislatures have crafted a statutory solution to the problem of corporate 
dissolution.  As judges were powerless to prolong the existence of the 
corporate entity itself, the trust fund doctrine imposed liabilities and duties 
upon individual directors and shareholders.60  Insofar as corporations are 
creatures of statute, however, legislatures possess the ability to statutorily 
manipulate their existence and modify their legal attributes.61  Consequently, 
many states enacted laws that precluded claim abatement upon dissolution 
and/or statutorily extended a dissolved corporation’s existence.62  Commonly 
referred to as “survival statutes,”63 nearly all jurisdictions have now adopted 
some variant of these laws.64  While differing in certain respects, most state 
dissolution statutes extend the existence of a dissolved corporation for a 
specified number of years (generally ranging from two to five) and prevent 
common law claim abatement at dissolution.65  Under most statutes, the 
existence of a dissolved corporation is temporarily prolonged solely for the 
 
 56. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 57. Okla. Natural Gas Co., 273 U.S. at 260 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 5361); In re 
RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92, 95 (Del. Ch. 1992); JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
CORPORATIONS § 26.08, at 714 (2d ed. 2003). 
 58. Norton, supra note 31, at 1071. 
 59.  See Wood, 30 F. Cas. at 437; In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d at 95; 19 AM. JUR. 2D 
Corporations § 2419, at 515 (2009). 
 60.  See Okla. Natural Gas Co., 273 U.S. at 259 (“But corporations exist for specific 
purposes, and only by legislative act, so that if the life of the corporation is to continue even only 
for litigating purposes it is necessary that there should be some statutory authority for the 
prolongation.”). 
 61. Cf. id. (acknowledging corporations exist by legislative will). 
 62. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 14.07, cmt. at 14-68 (4th ed. 2008). 
 63. See Stilson, supra note 2, at 68–69. 
 64. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  For Delaware’s statutory dissolution scheme, 
see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 275–282 (2008). 
 65. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 14.07, cmt. at 14-68, 14-71. 
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purposes of properly administering corporate assets and disposing of corporate 
liabilities.66 
The pervasive development of state dissolution statutes has largely 
displaced the equitable trust fund doctrine.67  Insofar as this doctrine filled the 
gaps of the common law by providing corporate claimants with a means of 
recovery at dissolution, state dissolution statutes seem to have largely fulfilled 
this purpose.68  Moreover, by enabling creditors to satisfy their claims against 
the corporation for an extended period after dissolution, these statutes seem to 
have substantially mitigated the incentive for opportunistic dissolution.  Yet, 
these statutes have not entirely abrogated the potential for corporate 
opportunism.  An analysis of modern statutory dissolution schemes, 
specifically that of Delaware, reveals a distinct gap.  While most state 
dissolution statutes adequately dispose of claims arising prior to or during the 
corporation’s statutorily-extended existence, few address the possibility of 
claims accruing after the corporation’s prolonged existence but stemming from 
pre-dissolution conduct.  For instance, few, if any, state survival statues would 
adequately address the potential for liability where a corporation discharges 
toxic chemicals into a water source and dissolves a decade before authorities 
discover the contamination.  In his description of Delaware’s dissolution 
statute, Chancellor Allen describes this statutory gap: 
 This modern scheme still leaves open the question, what, if any, rights are 
afforded to persons who have no claim against a corporation at the time of its 
dissolution, or during the statutory wind-up period, but who do thereafter 
 
 66. Id. at 14-68 (“[M]any jurisdictions also provided that the existence of the corporation 
continued after dissolution for the purpose of prosecuting or defending against litigation.”); 
Stilson, supra note 2, at 66–68 (“States reacted to the harsh effects of the common law by 
enacting modern dissolution statutes which permitted corporations to retain title in firm property 
for the limited purpose of winding up corporate affairs.”). 
 67. COX & HAZEN, supra note 57, at 714; 15A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 34, § 7373, at 
65; Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 176 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We are persuaded by the general 
consensus that modern statutory remedies have effectively replaced the trust fund doctrine . . . .”). 
 68. See Pac. Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Cal. 1988) (“In view of 
the detailed statutory remedies now encompassing virtually all claims previously asserted in 
equity against the former shareholders of dissolved corporations, we must similarly conclude that 
the Legislature has occupied the field and precluded resort to dormant common law doctrines for 
provision of extra-statutory relief.”); see also In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92, 95 (Del. Ch. 1992) 
(“Modernly, the problem that the trust fund doctrine addresses has been ameliorated by 
provisions in the corporate codes of most or all jurisdictions that continue the existence of the 
corporation as a jural entity for limited purposes following dissolution.”); Hunter v. Fort Worth 
Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex. 1981) (“The effect of these statutes was to supplant the 
equitable trust fund theory by declaring a statutory equivalent.”).  But see Green v. Oilwell, 767 
P.2d 1348, 1353 (Okla. 1989) (“[T]he equitable trust fund doctrine is available to a claimant 
injured by a defective product after the dissolution of a corporate manufacturer against the former 
shareholders of the dissolved corporation to the extent of the assets received by them.”). 
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acquire such a claim. . . .  It would seem apparent that such a person could not 
sue the dissolved corporation itself. . . .  But has such a person a cognizable 
claim against others—against directors or shareholders most notably? 
 This I take to be an unclear and troubling question.69 
While such an abstract hypothetical may seem like a mere pedagogical 
exercise, the potential for post-dissolution claims in modern society is real.  As 
the Delaware Court of Chancery observed, “the problem of compensation to 
persons injured by defective products or by undiscovered and actionable 
environmental injury, caused by dissolved corporations, is of obvious social 
concern.”70  In addition, the possibility of such claims raises important 
questions about the operations of various statutory dissolution schemes, and 
the role shareholder liability plays therein. 
II.  CORPORATE DISSOLUTION UNDER DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION 
LAW 
A. The Policies Underlying Delaware’s Dissolution Statute 
Traditionally, corporate dissolution has precipitated a conflict between tort 
law and corporate law.  Seeking to facilitate the efficient use of capital, the 
predominant theme in corporate dissolution law is the expeditious distribution 
of corporate assets in a flexible manner that provides recipients with a 
reasonable degree of certainty regarding the security of their respective 
shares.71  Contrastingly, the goal of tort law is to efficiently allocate losses by 
compelling defendants to compensate injured claimants.72  To achieve this end, 
tort law seeks to ensure the continuing availability of corporate assets to 
compensate parties who suffer injuries at the hands of a corporation or 
manufacturer.  As a specific example, products liability law imposes strict 
liability upon manufacturers whose products injure consumers.73  And, as most 
causes of action for products liability accrue at the time of injury, proper 
compensation may require the preservation of corporate assets for an extended 
period after dissolution if injuries occur after a corporation dissolves. 
 
 69. In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d at 96.  In Territory of the United States Virgin Islands v. 
Goldman, Sachs & Co., the Chancery Court again noted the existence of this statutory gap: 
Specifically, § 278, as well as § 325(b) of the DGCL, bore on a question less than ideally 
certain under Delaware law (and American corporate law more generally): what, if any, 
liability was owed by corporate stockholders and directors for the activities of a dissolved 
corporation that occurred before its dissolution but where the claims regarding those 
activities arose only after its dissolution? 
937 A.2d 760, 767 (Del. Ch. 2007), aff’d, 956 A.2d 32 (Del. 2008). 
 70. In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d at 96. 
 71. Sarlitto, supra note 1, at 1065. 
 72. See Schnall, supra note 2, at 167. 
 73. See id. 
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Delaware’s statutory dissolution scheme strikes a delicate balance between 
these two competing policy concerns.74  By requiring corporations to provide 
adequate security for unknown but foreseeable claimants, Delaware’s 
dissolution statute “recognizes rights in unknown future corporate claimants 
and provides a level of assurance to such persons that . . . reasonable provision 
will be made for their future claims.”75  The statute also fulfills the goals of 
corporate law.  Promoting flexibility at dissolution, directors have the ability to 
choose between two different methods of claim disposition and asset 
distribution that provide differing levels of protection from liability76—formal, 
judicially supervised wind-up, or informal, extrajudicial wind-up.77  
Compliance with either method provides directors and shareholders with an 
efficient method of asset distribution and a reasonable, though different, degree 
of protection from personal liability.78  A brief analysis of these statutory 
provisions will reveal the specific manner in which the Delaware legislature 
has attempted to balance these policies, and the extent to which they were 
successful in so doing. 
B. The Operation of Delaware’s Statutory Dissolution Scheme 
Delaware’s statutory dissolution scheme is contained in Sections 275 
through 282 of Title 8 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL).79  
Under these provisions, a Delaware corporation dissolves upon duly disposing 
of all outstanding franchise tax liabilities and filing a certificate of dissolution 
with the secretary of state.80  Notably, Delaware’s dissolution statute allows 
either directors or shareholders to independently initiate dissolution.81  
Pursuant to DGCL Section 278, the existence of a dissolved corporation is 
automatically extended for a period of three years from the effective date of 
dissolution, or for such longer period as the Court of Chancery deems 
necessary.82  Any claim initiated against the corporation prior to or within the 
three-year period does not abate by reason of the dissolution, and a 
corporation’s statutory existence may be extended beyond the three-year 
 
 74. In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d at 97; Schnall, supra note 2, at 166–68. 
 75. In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d at 97. 
 76. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281(a)–(b) (2008); S.B. 93, 134th Gen. Assemb. § 280 cmt. 
(Del. 1987) (“The section (and Section 281, as amended) is designed to provide a ‘safe harbor’ 
such that if the procedures described in Section 280 are followed and assets are distributed in 
accordance with Section 281, as amended, directors . . . will not be held personally liable to 
unpaid claimants of the corporation for having improperly distributed assets.”). 
 77. See tit. 8, §§ 280–281. 
 78. In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d at 97; Schnall, supra note 2, at 167–69. 
 79. See tit. 8, §§ 275–282. 
 80. See id. §§ 275(f), 277. 
 81. Id. § 275(a)–(c). 
 82. Id. § 278. 
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limitation solely for the purpose of disposing of previously filed claims.83  In 
addition, Section 278 strictly limits a corporation’s post-dissolution activities.  
During its three-year winding-up period, a corporation may not continue in the 
business for which it was organized.84  Rather, corporate existence is 
statutorily extended exclusively for the following purposes: 1) prosecuting and 
defending suits; 2) gradually settling and closing corporate business; 3) 
disposing of and conveying corporate property; 4) discharging liabilities; and 
5) distributing to stockholders any remaining assets.85  After the expiration of 
the three-year period, or of the period specified by the Court of Chancery, the 
corporation ceases to exist as a legal entity.86  Similar to the common law rule, 
the termination of the corporation’s existence constitutes its “civil death,”87 
and thereby renders it incapable of acting in a corporate capacity or sustaining 
liabilities.88 
After dissolution under Section 278 and during the corporation’s extended 
existence, directors may choose between two different statutory methods of 
administering the corporation’s assets and disposing of its liabilities.89  
Sections 280 through 281 provide directors with a choice between a formal, 
judicially supervised wind-up procedure, and an informal, extrajudicial asset 
distribution process.90  If the directors of a dissolved corporation elect to 
administer corporate assets and dispose of liabilities under judicial supervision, 
they must comply with the provisions of Sections 280 through 281(a).  The 
provisions of these sections set forth a complex claim management scheme that 
contains various notice and claim-classification provisions.  Under Section 
280, a corporation that elects formal wind-up is required to publish notice of its 
dissolution in a specified manner and for a specified period of time.91  
Claimants with mature causes of action who fail to timely notify the 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Tit. 8, § 278. 
 85. In re Citadel Indus., Inc., 423 A.2d 500, 504 (Del. Ch. 1980) (interpreting Section 278). 
 86. Id. at 503. 
 87. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *484. 
 88. In re Citadel Indus., Inc., 423 A.2d at 503; see also Smith-Johnson S.S. Corp. v. United 
States, 231 F. Supp. 184, 186–87 (D. Del. 1964) (a corporation “lacks capacity” to be sued after 
the three-year period under Section 278 expires). 
 89. See tit. 8, §§ 280–281. 
 90. Compare id. §§ 280–281(a), with id. § 281(b).  For the sake of brevity and clarity, this 
Comment will refer to judicially supervised corporate wind-up under Sections 280 through 281(a) 
as “formal wind-up,” and extrajudicial wind-up under Section 280(b) as “informal wind-up.” 
 91. Id. § 280(a)(1).  After dissolution, a “corporation . . . may give notice of dissolution, 
requiring all persons having a claim against the corporation other than a claim against the 
corporation in a pending action, suit or proceeding to which the corporation is a party to present 
their claims.”  Id.  This notice must “be published at least once a week for 2 consecutive weeks,” 
and must state, inter alia, “[t]he date by which such a claim must be received by the corporation 
or successor entity, which date shall be no earlier than 60 days from the date thereof.”  Id. 
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corporation of their claim are barred from future recovery.92  This notification 
procedure enables directors to efficiently identify all corporate claimants, and 
thereby facilitates judicious and efficient claim management. 
After providing notice to all known claimants,93 the directors are required 
to administer corporate assets in accordance with the claim-management 
provisions of Section 280.  This Section divides claims into three classes: 1) 
matured or pending claims known to the corporation;94 2) contingent 
contractual claims known to the corporation;95 and 3) unknown, but reasonably 
foreseeable claims.96  If the directors fail to privately settle all known claims 
with the opposing parties, they must “petition the Court of Chancery to 
determine the amount and form of security that will be reasonably likely to be 
sufficient” for any pending claims or contingent contractual claims.97  In 
addition, Section 280(c)(3) requires a formal judicial procedure to determine 
the potential for any unknown future claims, and the amount of corporate 
assets necessary for the satisfaction thereof.98  Under this section, a dissolved 
corporation is required to “petition the Court of Chancery to determine the 
amount . . . of security” to be posted to satisfy potential claims that may “arise 
or . . . become known to the corporation” between five and ten years after 
dissolution.99 
Depending upon the nature of the corporation’s business, it may be 
necessary to employ an “actuarial analysis of statistically possible claims” in 
order to properly fulfill the requirements of this section.100  Moreover, the 
Court of Chancery may, in its discretion, appoint a guardian ad litem at the 
corporation’s expense to represent the interests of the potential claimants.101 
After the Court of Chancery has determined the proper amounts of 
“security” under Section 280,102 the directors of the dissolved corporation are 
required to distribute corporate assets in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 281(a).  Pursuant to this section, the directors must pay all of the 
judicially determined claims in full to the extent corporate assets so provide.103  
 
 92. Id. § 280(a)(2). 
 93. Id. § 280(a)(1). 
 94. Tit. 8, § 280(a)(1). 
 95. Id. § 280(b)(1). 
 96. Id. § 280(c)(3). 
 97. Id. § 280(c)(1). 
 98. Id. § 280(c)(3). 
 99. Tit. 8, § 280(c)(3).  This five- to ten-year period includes the automatic three-year 
extension provided by Section 278; see id. § 278 (“All corporations . . . shall nevertheless be 
continued, for the term of 3 years from such expiration or dissolution . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 100. Stilson, supra note 2, at 35. 
 101. Tit. 8, § 280(c)(3). 
 102. Id. § 280(c)(1)–(3). 
 103. Id. § 281(a). 
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If any assets remain after such provisions, the corporation may distribute the 
residue to the stockholders.104  If the assets are insufficient to satisfy the 
claims, the corporation must provide for the claims by their priority, and 
ratably amongst equally-prioritized claims.105  While the statute does not 
prescribe a means of prioritization, Section 281(c) and relevant case law 
suggest the existence of parity between present and future claims.106 
A dissolved corporation may also choose to wind up its business and 
dispose of its liabilities in an informal, extrajudicial manner.107  While this 
method has certain implications for director and shareholder liability, it is 
significantly less complex and time-consuming. Under this scheme, Section 
281(b) provides an abbreviated dissolution process that enables directors to 
independently assess corporate claims without judicial supervision.  Pursuant 
to this section, a dissolved corporation is simply required to adopt a plan of 
distribution prior to the expiration of the corporation’s extended three-year 
post-dissolution existence under Section 278.108  Similar in form to the claim 
classification provisions of Section 280, the relevant segments of Section 
281(b) require a dissolved corporation to make reasonable provisions to pay: 1) 
all current and pending claims; 2) contingent contractual claims; and 3) 
unknown claims that “based on the facts known to the corporation . . . [or] are 
likely to arise or to become known . . . within 10 years after the date of 
dissolution.”109  The corporation is then required to pay all such claims in full 
to the extent its assets allow.110  If the assets are insufficient, the corporation 
must pay the claims “according to their priority and . . . ratably” amongst 
equally prioritized claims.111 
Delaware’s dissolution statute thus provides directors with two distinct 
means of disposing of corporate claims and distributing corporate assets.  
Under Sections 280 and 281, a dissolved corporation engages in a complex 
notice and claim management process that entails judicial supervision and 
judicially-stipulated provisions of security. Under these sections, a corporation 
must petition the Court of Chancery to provide security for any unsettled 
pending or contingent claims or unknown future claims.112  Contrastingly, 
Section 281(b) provides an informal process that enables a corporation to 
construct its own plan of claim provision and asset distribution, and implement 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See tit. 8, § 281(a)–(b); In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92, 109–11 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
 107. See tit. 8, § 281(b). 
 108. Id. § 281(b). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Tit. 8, § 280(c)(1)–(3); see also id. § 281(a) (establishing payment and notice 
requirements). 
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that plan extrajudicially.  Thus, a corporation that elects to dissolve under this 
section may forego the judicial formalities required under formal 
dissolution.113  While this choice provides corporate directors and shareholders 
with flexibility during corporate dissolution, it also creates the potential for 
corporate opportunism.  Given the increased complexity of Sections 280 and 
281(a), and the fact that judicially determined provisions of security may 
deplete shareholder dissolution distributions, corporations with potential future 
liability may opportunistically exploit the informal wind-up procedures under 
Section 281(b).  Delaware’s scheme must preclude such exploitation as a 
means of avoiding liability.  The legislature seems to have achieved this 
through a judicious allocation of liabilities. 
C. Director and Shareholder Liability at Dissolution 
The extent to which directors and shareholders are protected from personal 
liability during and after corporate dissolution is a function of the chosen 
method of asset distribution.  So long as the corporation properly distributes its 
assets under either Sections 280 through 281(a) or Section 281(b), shareholders 
are only liable to corporate claimants up to the lesser of their pro rata share of 
the claim or the amount they received in dissolution distributions.114  However, 
Section 282(b) provides an additional degree of protection for shareholders of 
a corporation the assets of which were distributed under court supervision 
pursuant to Sections 280 and 281(a).  The stockholders of such a corporation 
are not liable for any claim against the corporation brought after the three-year 
dissolution period under Section 278.115  This affirmative grant of protection to 
the stockholders of a corporation that distributes its assets under the formal 
method of Sections 280 through 281(a) impliedly suggests the absence of such 
protection for the stockholders of a corporation that distributes its assets under 
the informal provisions of Section 281(b).116  Thus, a facial reading of the 
statute suggests that formal dissolution pursuant to Sections 280 and 281(a) 
provides shareholders with a greater degree of protection from pro rata liability 
to corporate creditors than does informal dissolution under Section 281(b). 
Formal dissolution under Sections 280 and 281(a) also provides directors 
with a greater degree of protection from personal liability.117  While Section 
 
 113. Id. § 281(b). 
 114. Id. § 282(a). 
 115. Id. § 282(b). 
 116. Schnall, supra note 2, at 169 & n.180 (“Unlike the elective scheme, the default provision 
of section 281(b) does not restrict the time period in which corporate creditors can seek 
satisfaction of their claims from shareholders who received a distribution of the dissolved 
corporation’s assets, and so these shareholders are potentially at risk for liability to corporate 
creditors indefinitely.”) (footnote omitted). 
 117. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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281(c) states that directorial compliance with either the formal distribution 
requirements under Section 281(a) or the informal requirements of Section 
281(b) will shield directors from personal liability, a closer reading of the 
statute suggests that protection under the latter section is somewhat dubious.118  
Compliance with the formal provisions of Sections 280 and 281(a) is 
confirmed upon judicial approval of the directors’ provisions of security for 
corporate claimants.119  Thus, upon judicial confirmation of the requisite 
security under Section 280(c) and distribution of the required assets, directors 
can be certain they complied with the statutory requirements.120  Certain 
compliance with the informal methods of Section 281(b), however, is 
significantly more difficult. Insofar as Section 281(b) requires directors to 
make provisions “reasonably likely to be sufficient” for various claimants, 
directors may be personally liable if their provisions of security and asset 
distributions are not “reasonable,” as determined by later litigation.121  
Consequently, informal asset distribution under Section 281(b) exposes 
directors to uncertainty and potentially extensive liability, “regardless of their 
good faith and due care.”122 
D. The Operational Symmetry of Delaware’s Statutory Dissolution Scheme 
The antecedent review of Sections 278 through 282 suggests that 
Delaware’s dissolution scheme adequately satisfies both of its underlying 
policy concerns.123  Through claim management, judicial supervision, and a 
judicious allocation of liability, these statutory provisions provide both 
flexibility and security to corporations at dissolution and reasonable protection 
for potential post-dissolution claimants.  Formal dissolution under Sections 
280 and 281(a) provides directors and shareholders with protection from 
personal liability while simultaneously providing potential post-dissolution 
claimants with judicially-approved security.  However, formal dissolution is 
both time-consuming and expensive.  Thus, Section 281(b) provides 
corporations that lack any serious potential for future liabilities with the ability 
to pursue an informal and less expensive method of asset distribution 
extrajudicially.  However, the distribution of corporate assets under Section 
281(b) does not provide future creditors with the same degree of protection as 
 
 118. In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92, 97 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
 119. See tit. 8, §§ 280(c), 281(c). 
 120. See In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d at 97 (“[C]ompliance with subsection (b)’s standard, 
‘reasonably likely to be sufficient’ will, in principle at least, always be litigable. . . .  
[S]ubsection(a) of  Section 281 . . . if successfully completed, can eliminate this risk.”). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Schnall, supra note 2, at 166–67 (listing “competing goals of product liability and 
corporate dissolution law”). 
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the elective provisions.124  Thus, the statute prevents corporate opportunism by 
exposing both directors and shareholders to a greater degree of liability if the 
corporation selects this method.125  The potential for personal shareholder and 
directorial liability after informal asset distribution, combined with the “safe 
harbor”126 provisions of formal asset distribution under Sections 280 through 
281(a), serve to channel those corporations that have potential future liabilities 
to utilize the formal procedures. 
Thus, by providing greater protection to both directors and shareholders 
under formal distribution, and by exposing directors and shareholders to 
greater liability under informal distribution, Delaware’s statutory scheme 
incentivizes judicially supervised distribution for those corporations that have 
potential future claimants.127  In so doing, the statutory scheme protects future 
claimants, thereby satisfying the policies of tort and products liability law.128  
However, the internal coherency of this scheme is potentially threatened by a 
recent holding of the Court of Chancery, affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Delaware.129 
III.  TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS V. GOLDMAN, SACHS & 
CO: A POTENTIAL BREAKDOWN OF DELAWARE’S STATUTORY DISSOLUTION 
SCHEME 
A. The Facts of Goldman, Sachs & Co. 
The facts of Territory of the United States v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. 
(“Goldman Sachs”) are relatively protracted and complex.130  In 2006, the 
Virgin Islands of the United States (“the Virgin Islands”) filed suit against 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“Goldman Sachs”) in the Court of Chancery of 
Delaware to recover approximately $9.9 million in dissolution distributions 
Goldman Sachs received as a thirteen percent passive shareholder of Panex 
 
 124. Id. at 171. 
 125. See supra Part II.C. 
 126. S.B. 93, 134th Gen. Assemb. § 280 cmt. (Del. 1987). 
 127. See Schnall, supra note 2, at 175 (“While both the elective provisions of sections 280 
and 281(a) and the default provision of section 281(b) provide the directors of corporations 
planning dissolution with the flexibility to choose the provisions which they judge to be most 
suitable, the elective provisions appear to offer the best solution to the competing interests of 
directors and shareholders of a dissolved corporation and those of foreseeable, unknown future 
claimants.”). 
 128. See id. at 168 (“[T]he goal of products liability law is better served by the elective 
procedure of sections 280 and 281(a).”). 
 129. Territory of the U.S. V.I. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d 760 (Del. Ch. 2007), aff’d, 
956 A.2d 32 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008). 
 130. Id. at 765.  As a full recapitulation would exceed the scope and purpose of this 
Comment, a brief summary of the pertinent facts and holdings will suffice for purposes of 
analyzing Delaware’s statutory dissolution scheme. 
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Industries, Inc. (“Panex”).131  According to the Virgin Islands, a modern 
version of the trust fund doctrine required Goldman Sachs to disgorge 
dissolution distributions it received from Panex in order to satisfy a default 
judgment obtained against Panex after its dissolution for alleged prior 
environmental contamination.132 
In 1985, Panex, a Delaware corporation, duly filed its articles of 
dissolution and, in order to exploit favorable tax provisions, conducted its 
three-year winding-up process through a liquidation trust.133  Prior to the 
expiration of its statutory existence under Section 278, Panex’s liquidation 
trust distributed approximately $9.9 million to Goldman Sachs in its capacity 
as a corporate shareholder.134  In 1992, approximately four years after Panex’s 
statutory existence expired, the Virgin Islands joined Panex and its directors in 
suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) and common law tort claims predicated on alleged 
environmental contamination on the island of St. Thomas.135  After the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the Virgin Island’s claims against Panex 
and its directors,136 the Virgin Islands amended their complaint to include both 
Panex’s successor trust and Goldman Sachs in its capacity as a shareholder.137  
The Virgin Islands subsequently dismissed its claims against Goldman Sachs 
without prejudice in 1998.138  However, after protracted environmental 
litigation forced Panex’s successor trust to accept a $51.6 million default 
judgment, the Virgin Islands renewed its suit against Goldman Sachs in 
Delaware’s Court of Chancery as a judgment-creditor of the successor trust.139 
In order to collect from Goldman Sachs, the Virgin Islands invoked a 
contemporary variant of the trust fund doctrine.140  The first count of the 
Virgin Island’s two-count complaint alleged that Goldman Sachs would be 
 
 131. Id. at 765, 770, 782–83. 
 132. Id. at 782–84. 
 133. Id. at 766. 
 134. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 770. 
 135. Id. at 770–71. 
 136. After dismissing the common law claims, the District Court for the Virgin Islands 
originally found that CERCLA preempted time limits for winding up a corporation under the 
Delaware Code, but after a contrary decision by the Third Circuit, the District Court tried to avoid 
dismissing the CERCLA claims on the grounds that the life of a corporation as a entity capable of 
maintaining a suit was extended by the existence of the Liquidating Trust.  Id. at 773–74, 778.  
The Third Circuit rejected this logic and reversed without opinion.  Id. at 774 (citing In re Tutu 
Wells Contamination Litig., 74 F.3d 1228 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
 137. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 779 (citing In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 
994 F. Supp. 638, 646 (D.V.I. 1998)). 
 138. Id. at 782. 
 139. Id. at 781, 782–83. 
 140. Id. at 784. 
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“unjustly enriched” if it were allowed to keep dissolution distributions.141  The 
Virgin Islands argued that equity required Goldman Sachs, as a shareholder of 
Panex, to disgorge its dissolution distributions due the superior—though late-
arising—claim of a corporate creditor.142  Goldman Sachs subsequently filed a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.143  The primary issue before the 
Court of Chancery was whether Goldman Sachs was liable for the distributions 
it received pursuant to Panex’s dissolution plan, despite the fact that the Virgin 
Islands did not file its environmental claims against Panex until at least four 
years after Panex’s statutory existence had expired under Section 278.144 
B. The Chancery Court’s Holding and Rationale 
On the issue of Goldman Sachs’s liability for its dissolution 
distributions,145 the Court of Chancery held that Sections 278 and 325(b) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law precluded the Virgin Islands from 
recovering against Goldman Sachs after the termination of Panex’s three-year 
statutorily-extended existence.146  Despite the complexity of the surrounding 
issues, the court’s application of Delaware’s pre-1987147 dissolution statute 
was relatively straightforward.  Under Section 278, Panex ceased to exist as a 
juridical entity three years after its dissolution in 1985 and, therefore, was 
incapable of participating in legal proceedings at any point after 1988.148  The 
court quoted Section 325(b): “[n]o suit shall be brought against any . . . 
stockholder for any debt of a corporation of which he is a[] . . . stockholder, 
until judgment be obtained therefor [sic] against the corporation and execution 
thereon be returned unsatisfied.”149  Thus, reasoned the court, the nonexistence 
of Panex in 1992 and 1996 under Section 278 precluded the Virgin Islands 
from obtaining an unexecuted judgment against the corporation.150  The Virgin 
Islands had to obtain a judgment against Panex prior to filing a claim against 
 
 141. Id. at 783. 
 142. See Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 783. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 788. 
 145. The court also disposed of issues concerning collateral estoppel, laches, and the 
utilization of a liquidation trust in corporate dissolution.  See id. at 764. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Due to the timing of the Virgin Islands’ lawsuit and the prolonged succession of 
corporate entities dating back to 1968, the court was required to apply Delaware’s statutory 
dissolution scheme as it existed prior to the 1987 amendments.  See Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 
A.2d at 798.  However, the relevant provisions—Sections 278 and 325(b)—are substantially 
identical to Delaware’s current General Corporation Law. 
 148. Id. at 788. 
 149. Id. at 789 (alterations in original) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 325(b) (1985)). 
 150. See id. (noting that Panex’s capacity to sue and be sued expired in 1988 through 
operation of Section 278). 
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Goldman Sachs, a shareholder thereof, under Section 325(b).151  Therefore, the 
court concluded Section 278 in conjunction with Section 325(b) barred the 
Virgin Islands from holding Goldman Sachs liable for the receipt of its 
dissolution distributions from Panex.152 
As a result of the statutory preclusion of its claim, the Virgin Islands 
attempted to invoke the chancery court’s equitable jurisdiction by seeking 
extra-statutory relief predicated on a modern variant of the trust fund doctrine.  
Essentially, the Virgin Islands argued for a rule according to which a corporate 
shareholder who receives dissolution distributions is liable to return those 
distributions if a subsequent claimant emerges at any time with a valid claim 
against the corporation.153  The court ultimately rejected this argument, 
concluding that Delaware’s legislative enactments precluded judicial 
intervention.154  The court predicated its conclusion on two distinct bases: 1) 
The three-year wind-up period created by Section 278 manifested a conclusive 
legislative policy determination that three years was a sufficient time within 
which to bring claims against a dissolved corporation; and 2) The rule invoked 
by the Virgin Islands was excessively broad in its reach, and thereby 
implicated a host of potentially deleterious consequences for the economic 
vitality of equity investments in corporate enterprises.155 
The court first rested its conclusion on its conception of the policy 
underlying the former version of Section 278.  According to the court, the 
three-year wind-up period created by Section 278 constituted a legislative 
policy determination as to the appropriate and exclusive time within which a 
corporate creditor may brings claims against a dissolved corporation.156  Under 
Delaware’s pre-1987 dissolution scheme, the court reasoned, Section 278 
struck a balance between the interests of corporate creditors and 
shareholders.157  According to the court, the legislative extension of a dissolved 
corporation’s existence for three years provided creditors with sufficient time 
to bring claims after corporate dissolution.158  In addition, by barring any 
claims arising after this three-year period, Section 278 provided corporate 
directors and shareholders with “repose” from potential future liabilities.159  
Therefore, the court concluded, the conjoined application of Sections 325(b) 
and 278 to preclude post-dissolution claims against shareholders arising three 
years after corporate dissolution achieves the legislature’s policy “in a 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 789. 
 153. See id. at 784. 
 154. Id. at 793. 
 155. See id. at 789–98. 
 156. Id. at 789. 
 157. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 789. 
 158. Id. at 789–91. 
 159. Id. at 789. 
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measured way.”160  The Court of Chancery thus believed itself bound by this 
determination and was thereby precluded from circumventing the statute by 
means of the trust fund doctrine.161 
The court noted the excessively broad reach of the Virgin Islands’ 
proposed theory of recovery as an additional reason for denying relief.162  In its 
criticism of the Virgin Islands’ theory, the court specifically noted both the 
absence of any requirement that the directors of a corporation know or have 
reason to know of future claims for which stockholders may be liable and the 
lack of time constraints on the post-dissolution liability of shareholders.163  The 
court reasoned that the potential for temporally indeterminate shareholder 
liability arising from claims—of which the directors had no knowledge or 
reason to know—would have several negative consequences for equitable 
shareholders.  According to the court, the potential for temporally-
indeterminate liability for dissolution distributions would cause “stockholders 
of American corporations [to] . . . live in constant fear” that they may be liable 
for late-arising claims.164  As a result, stockholders “would hesitate to use 
those assets [they received from corporate dissolution] or to reinvest the 
assets” and, eventually, would “question the wisdom of making equity 
investments in corporations in the first instance.”165  In addition, the court 
noted that the imposition of temporally indeterminate liability upon 
contemporary shareholders would have potentially far-reaching consequences.  
According to the court, a significant portion of corporate stock is currently held 
by mutual and pension funds, the administrators of which are “fiduciaries for 
ordinary investors, such as Americans saving for college and retirement.”166  
Requiring administrators and shareholders of this type to account for 
dissolution distributions “a generation later” would seriously disrupt this 
 
 160. Id. at 784. 
 161. Id. at 789–90 (“In determining that winding-up provisions like § 278 preclude 
stockholder liability under a common law trust fund theory, I join the majority of courts and 
commentators who have addressed the question of whether the adoption of corporate dissolution 
statutes supplanted the trust fund doctrine.”). 
 162. See Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d  at 792–93. 
 163. Id. at 792 (“If, as seems probable, the public interest in promoting economic growth 
would be impaired by exposing equity investors to perpetual risk of this kind, a container of some 
kind on the trust fund doctrine would have to be built.”); see also id. at 793 (“What I find 
unfathomable is the notion that this state would adopt, as part of its common law of equity, a trust 
fund doctrine that puts stockholders receiving distributions from a dissolving corporation at risk 
of liability when the creditor-plaintiff made no demand of any type on the dissolving corporation 
and the dissolving corporation’s directors had no reason to believe such a demand would be made 
before the expiration of the extra three-year period established by § 278.”) (emphasis added). 
 164. Id. at 792. 
 165. See id. at 796 (footnote omitted). 
 166. Id. at 797 n.163. 
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beneficial method of investment.167  The court, therefore, concluded that 
important policy reasons further buttressed its application of the statute to 
preclude the Virgin Islands’ theory of recovery. 
In a final effort to obtain recovery, the Virgin Islands advanced a statutory-
construction argument that invoked the modern, amended version of 
Delaware’s dissolution statute.  While the contemporary version of Delaware’s 
dissolution statute—namely, Sections 280 through 282—was inapplicable to 
the case, the Virgin Islands argued that this statutory scheme illuminated 
legislative intent regarding the prior version of Sections 278 and 325(b), which 
exist in virtually identical form today.  According to the Virgin Islands, the 
application of Sections 278 and 325(b) to preclude recovery against 
shareholders for claims arising after a dissolved corporation’s extended three-
year existence would render the additional protection afforded by Section 
282(b) superfluous.168  In short, if the shareholders of a corporation are 
protected from all claims three years after dissolution under Sections 278 and 
325(b)—regardless of the chosen method of dissolution—then the protection 
supplied by Section 282(b) only for the shareholders of a corporation that 
elected formal dissolution would be meaningless.  Therefore, if Section 282(b) 
is to meaningfully incentivize formal dissolution, it must provide greater 
protection from liability to shareholders and directors of a corporation that 
chooses formal dissolution than to the shareholders and directors of a 
corporation that chooses informal dissolution.  Otherwise, Section 282 
essentially serves no purpose. 
Despite the patent reasonableness of this argument, the court ultimately 
rejected it on policy grounds.169  While the court noted the “cognitive 
dissonance” created by the application of Sections 325(b) and 278 to 
Delaware’s modern dissolution scheme, it concluded that resolution of 
apparent “gap” was a legislative task.170  Specifically, the court reasoned that 
the mere provision of heightened protection for the shareholders of a 
corporation that dissolved under formal supervision pursuant to Sections 280 
and 281(a) did not necessarily imply temporally indeterminate liability for 
shareholders of a corporation that dissolved under the informal procedures of 
Section 281(b).171  The provision of heightened protection for one class of 
 
 167. See Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 797 n.163. 
 168. Id. at 798–99. 
 169. See id. at 799–800. 
 170. Id. at 798–99. 
 171. Id. at 799 (“That the 1987 Amendments injected more rigor into the overall dissolution 
process . . . and used § 282(b) as an incentive, does not mean that the General Assembly was 
implicitly creating or somehow recognizing the existence of a cause of action holding innocent 
stockholders strictly liable to return distributions received in dissolution whenever a later-arising 
creditor obtains a judgment based solely on the harm caused by a corporation’s pre-dissolution 
activities.”). 
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shareholders and corresponding silence as to the liability of the other did not, 
so the court believed, provide corporate claimants with a cause of action 
against the latter class of shareholders.172  Therefore, the court concluded that, 
despite the “cognitive dissonance” created by the Delaware’s modern 
dissolution scheme, Sections 278 and 325(b) still precluded imposition of an 
equitable trust against Goldman Sachs.173 
C. Summary of the Court’s Holding 
In sum, the chancery court held that Sections 278 and 325(b)174 preclude a 
corporate claimant from holding a shareholder liable for its dissolution 
distributions after the dissolved corporation’s three-year statutory existence 
expired.175  In addition, the court held that Sections 278 and 325(b) preclude 
judicial creation of an equitable remedy by which a corporate claimant may 
obtain extra-statutory relief for a claim arising after a dissolved corporation’s 
statutorily-extended existence expires.176  Therefore, the court ultimately held 
that the Virgin Islands was barred from compelling Goldman Sachs to disgorge 
the dissolution distributions it received from Panex to satisfy a post-dissolution 
claim filed at least four years after Panex’s three-year wind-up period 
expired.177 
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF GOLDMAN SACHS FOR DELAWARE’S CURRENT 
STATUTORY DISSOLUTION SCHEME AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
A. Implications of Applying Goldman Sachs to Sections 280–282 
The conjoined application of Sections 325(b) and 278 has potentially 
problematic implications for the proper operation of Delaware’s current 
statutory dissolution scheme.  As described above,178 Sections 280 through 282 
provide corporations with a choice between formal, judicially supervised wind-
up procedures under Sections 280 and 281(a), and informal, extrajudicial 
wind-up procedures under Section 281(b).  As a means of rewarding or 
incentivizing utilization of the formal wind-up procedures, Sections 281(c) and 
282(b) provide a “safe harbor” for the directors and shareholders of a 
corporation that distributes its assets in accordance with the requirements of 
 
 172. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 799. 
 173. See id. at 798–800. 
 174. While the court applied the former versions of these statutes, the current versions are 
substantially similar in form and wording. 
 175. See id. at 764. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See supra Part II. 
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those provisions.179  By providing this enhanced protection to directors and 
shareholders, Delaware’s dissolution scheme creates an incentive for 
dissolving corporations facing potential future liabilities to choose judicially 
supervised dissolution, despite its increased cost and technical requirements.180  
In contrast, the absence of such protection when a corporation elects to 
informally wind-up under Section 281(b) deters opportunistic use of this 
method as a means of avoiding future liabilities.  The Delaware Court of 
Chancery first construed these statutes in 1992 in In re RegO Co.181  The court 
observed: 
 Subsection 281(c) provides that directors of the corporation “shall not be 
personally liable to the claimants of the dissolved corporation” (presumably 
under the common law trust fund doctrine) if the corporation has “complied 
with subsections (a) or (b) of this section.”  But compliance with subsection 
(b)’s standard, “reasonably likely to be sufficient” will, in principle at least, 
always be litigable.  Thus, reliance upon the mechanism of Section 281(b) may 
present a risky situation for corporate directors regardless of their good faith 
and due care.182 
Thus, both legislative commentary and judicial interpretation confirm that 
only directors of corporations that employ the formal wind-up procedures 
under Sections 280 and 281(a) are afforded enhanced protection from personal 
liability.  This—in conjunction with the implication from Section 282(b) that 
shareholders of a dissolved corporation electing to employ informal wind-up 
will be exposed to temporally extended post-dissolution liability—creates a 
sufficient incentive for both directors and shareholders to employ formal 
dissolution under Sections 280 and 281(a) when there is the potential for future 
corporate liabilities.  Goldman Sachs, however, threatens to remove this 
incentive. 
In Goldman Sachs, the Court of Chancery held that Sections 278 and 
325(b) preclude: 1) a corporate claimant from holding a shareholder liable for 
its dissolution distributions after the dissolved corporation’s three-year 
statutory existence; and 2) judicial use of the trust fund doctrine to provide 
extra-statutory relief.183  This holding is alone sufficient to abrogate the 
shareholder incentive to approve of or propose formal wind-up under Sections 
280 and 281(a).184  So long as Sections 278 and 325(b) provide shareholders 
 
 179. S.B. 93, 134th Gen. Assemb. § 280 cmt. (Del. 1987). 
 180. Schnall, supra note 2, at 175. 
 181. 623 A.2d 92 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
 182. Id. at 97 (alteration in original) (quoting Section 281(c)). 
 183. See Territory of the U.S. V.I. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d 760, 763 (Del. Ch. 
2007), aff’d, 956 A.2d 32 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008). 
 184. Cf. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 798–99 (“Using § 282(b), the Virgin Islands 
makes a simple argument.  If that section must be construed as having some intended effect, it 
must preclude a reading of the pre-existing §§ 278 and 325(b) as barring claims against 
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with the same protection as Section 282(b), they have no economic reason to 
approve an expensive method of dissolution that could potentially diminish 
their liquidation distributions without providing any cognizable benefit. 
This holding may also be sufficient to abrogate the directorial incentive to 
employ the formal wind-up procedures under Sections 280 and 281(a).  While 
the court in Goldman Sachs did not employ Section 325(b) to preclude 
recovery against directors, the language of the statute is equally applicable to 
both shareholders and directors.  The relevant portion of Section 325(b) 
provides that “[n]o suit shall be brought against any officer, director or 
stockholder for any debt of a corporation of which such person is an officer, 
director or stockholder, until judgment be obtained therefore against the 
corporation and execution thereon returned unsatisfied.”185  Given this 
language, the court’s logic in Goldman Sachs is, in principle at least, equally 
apposite to directors.  Just as obtaining an unsatisfied judgment against the 
corporation is a prerequisite to holding a shareholder liable for dissolution 
distributions,186 such a judgment may also be a prerequisite to holding 
corporate directors liable for post-dissolution claims if they fail to make 
reasonable provisions under Section 281(b).  However, if the directors are to 
be held liable either by implication under Section 281(b) or—as the In re RegO 
Court suggested—under the trust fund doctrine,187 then the application of 
Sections 278 and 325(b) under Goldman Sachs precludes the imposition of 
liability in accordance with either theory.188  Therefore, Sections 278 and 
325(b) may potentially be invoked to preclude suit against corporate directors 
after the corporation’s three-year wind-up period is complete, even if the 
corporation employed the formal procedures under Section 281(b) and the 
directors failed to make provisions “reasonably likely to be sufficient”189 for 
foreseeable future claimants.  Consequently, corporate directors would receive 
the same degree of protection from personal liability regardless of whether the 
corporation employs extrajudicial wind-up procedures under Section 281(b). 
Thus, application of Section 325(b) in this manner may effectively 
abrogate the directorial incentive to elect formal corporate wind-up under 
Sections 280 and 281(a).  The safe harbor Delaware’s legislature expressly 
created would be superfluous, and the statutory scheme would fail to 
adequately provide protection for future claimants.  This result fails to comport 
with either the policy concerns underlying Sections 280 through 282 or 
 
stockholders after the three-year extension on the corporation’s existence under § 278 expired. 
Otherwise, there would be no reward for following the more rigorous § 281(a) process.”). 
 185. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 325(b) (2008) (emphasis added). 
 186. See Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 764. 
 187. See In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d at 97. 
 188. See Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 764. 
 189. Tit. 8, § 281(b). 
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explicitly stated legislative intent.  To avoid this outcome, it may be necessary 
for the Delaware General Assembly to rectify the “cognitive dissonance” 
created by the collateral application of Section 325(b) to Delaware’s statutory 
dissolution scheme. 190 
B. Solution I: Preserve the Original Integrity of Delaware’s Dissolution 
Scheme 
Amending Section 325(b) to render it inapplicable to claims arising under 
Sections 281(a) and 282(b) may preserve the internal coherence of Delaware’s 
statutory dissolution scheme while simultaneously fulfilling the policy 
concerns expressed in Goldman Sachs.  By precluding the ad hoc application 
of external statutory provisions to Sections 280 through 282, the Delaware 
General Assembly may be able to preserve the previously lauded191 balance 
between corporate and tort law policy goals and avoid the dangers observed in 
Goldman Sachs.  In Goldman Sachs, the court primarily sought to avoid 
exposing shareholders to temporally indeterminate liability for corporate 
claims that the directors had no reason to know of at dissolution.192  
Delaware’s current statutory dissolution scheme, however, can avoid these 
unfavorable consequence while protecting the interests of potential future 
claimants without the problematic application of Section 325(b) (i.e., removing 
the incentive for shareholders and, potentially, directors to utilize the formal 
wind-up procedures under Sections 280 and 281(a)). 
Assuming the inapplicability of Section 325(b), Sections 280 through 281 
incentivize the use of formal dissolution—which optimally benefits claimants, 
shareholders, and directors193— while exposing shareholders and directors to a 
significant, but limited, degree of liability if their corporation elects informal 
dissolution under Section 281(b).  Section 281(b) explicitly provides a 
temporal limit for post-dissolution shareholder liability when a corporation 
elects informal wind-up.194  Under this section, directors are only required to 
make provisions for claims that may foreseeably arise “within 10 years after 
the date of dissolution.”195  Thus, if the shareholders of such a corporation are 
 
 190. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 798–99 (“I must note the cognitive dissonance 
arguably injected by the General Assembly’s adoption in 1987 of substantial amendments to the 
DGCL’s provisions relating to dissolution.”). 
 191. See generally Schnall, supra note 2. 
 192. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 792–98. 
 193. The benefit accruing to directors and shareholders is an increased level of protection 
against liability.  Given the technicalities and requirements of formal dissolution under Sections 
280 through 282, it is likely to be more expensive.  Thus, it may decrease the amount of 
dissolution distributions available for shareholders.  However, it provides shareholders with more 
security in the assets they do receive, thus providing them with a cognizable benefit. 
 194. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281(b) (2008). 
 195. Id. 
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impliedly liable beyond the three-year wind-up period under Section 282(b), 
this liability would be limited to claims filed within ten years after corporate 
dissolution and of which the directors had reason to know.196  The shareholders 
of such a corporation would not, therefore, be exposed to temporally 
indeterminate liability for all late-arising claims.  Rather, they would only be 
liable for claims that the directors had reason to know may arise within ten 
years after dissolution.197  These two qualifications provide meaningful limits 
on the degree of potential shareholder liability under Section 282(b), and 
thereby avoid the negative consequences of temporally indeterminate liability 
observed in Goldman Sachs (i.e., preclusion of the beneficial utilization of 
dissolution distributions, the undue chilling of equitable investments in 
corporations, and the disruption of institutional investors managing the savings 
accounts of individuals).198  If, however, Delaware Courts of Chancery are 
determined to categorically limit post-dissolution shareholder liability to three 
years under Section 278, then the second proposed solution offers a more 
favorable alternative.199 
Importantly, the viability of this first solution depends upon a legislative 
recognition of a cause of action against shareholders and directors for claims 
arising after a corporation’s three-year wind-up period.  The Delaware 
Supreme Court’s recent affirmation of Goldman Sachs confirms that 
Delaware’s comprehensive statutory dissolution scheme precludes application 
of the trust fund doctrine.200  Thus, to maintain the theoretical consistency of 
the dissolution scheme, the Delaware General Assembly must explicitly 
recognize what Section 282(b) negatively implies; namely, the liability of 
shareholders after the three-year wind-up period for dissolution distributions 
received from a corporation that employed informal wind-up under Section 
281(b).  Given the judicial abrogation of the trust fund doctrine, a legislative 
pronouncement of post-dissolution liability for these shareholders is the only 
method by which late-arising claimants may hold such shareholders liable.  
This potential for future liability is necessary to deter corporate exploitation of 
the informal wind-up procedures at the expense of future claimants. 
Furthermore, the Delaware courts must also recognize the existence of an 
implied statutory duty incumbent upon directors under Section 281(b) to make 
reasonable provisions for foreseeable claimants.  If Sections 280 and 281(a) 
 
 196. See id. §§ 281(b), 282(b). 
 197. See id. § 281(b). 
 198. See Territory of the U.S. V.I. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d 760, 792–97 (Del. Ch. 
2007). 
 199. See infra Part IV.C. 
 200. See Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 763 (holding that Delaware General Corporate 
Law precluded the Virgin Islands from making a claim on a distribution to a shareholder), aff’d, 
956 A.2d 32 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008). 
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are to serve as a safe harbor in accordance with legislative intent, then there 
must be potential directorial liability against which the safe harbor provides 
protection.  In In re RegO Co., the court suggested that failure to comply with 
Section 281(c) would result in potential directorial liability under the trust fund 
doctrine.201  However, judicial rejection of this doctrine in Goldman Sachs202 
prevents its use as a means of imposing liability upon directors for 
noncompliance with Section 281(b).  In order to preserve the integrity of the 
statutory scheme, Delaware courts must recognize the existence of a statutory 
duty under Section 281(b),203 breach of which, directors will be personally 
liable.204  This recognition will deter opportunistic exploitation of informal 
corporate wind-up as a means of avoiding future liabilities.  As a corollary to 
this deterrence, protection from such liability for directors who elect formal 
wind-up provides an incentive to utilize these procedures when corporations 
face future liabilities.  This, in turn, will provide greater protection to any 
potential future claimants, as Sections 280 and 281(a) require judicial approval 
of a dissolved corporation’s provisions of security for future claims.205 
While this proposed solution preserves the initial integrity of Delaware’s 
dissolution scheme, it may provide less protection to shareholders then the 
court in Goldman Sachs would prefer.  Given the strong preference for 
substantially limiting post-dissolution shareholder reliability expressed in 
Goldman Sachs, a second solution may provide a more favorable alternative. 
C. Solution II: Categorically Limit Shareholder Liability After Dissolution 
and Impose Strict Duties on Directors 
Recognizing that the modern corporation is largely manager-controlled and 
that additional factors may be employed to deter director-initiated 
opportunistic dissolution, Delaware’s corporate dissolution statute may 
 
 201. In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92, 97 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
 202. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 789–90. 
 203. Rather than a judicially-imposed equitable duty. 
 204. See Gans v. MDR Liquidating Corp., No. 9630, 1990 WL 2851, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 
1990) (Section 281(b) “imposes a statutory duty upon the directors or trustees of a ‘dissolved 
corporation or successor entity which has not followed the procedures in § 280’ to ‘pay or make 
reasonable provisions to pay all claims and obligations’ of the dissolved corporation.”) (quoting 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281(b) (1987)).  Recognition of a statutory duty at dissolution is 
additionally important given the Supreme Court of Delaware’s recent decision in North American 
Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).  In 
Gheewalla, the court held that “[t]he creditors of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent 
or in the zone of insolvency have no right, as a matter of law, to assert direct claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty against its directors.”  Id. at 103.  Thus, the absence of both the trust fund doctrine 
and fiduciary-duty theory as means of imposing liability upon directors who fail to provide 
adequate security to future claimants in informal dissolution requires recognition of at least a 
statutory duty. 
 205. Tit. 8, §§ 280, 281(a). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] THE INTEGRITY OF DELAWARE’S CORPORATE DISSOLUTION STATUTE 1203 
adequately protect future claimants and limit shareholder liability regardless of 
the chosen method of winding-up corporate affairs.  In short, the imposition of 
a statutory duty on directors to provide adequate security for future claimants if 
the corporation pursues informal wind-up—in conjunction with additional 
legal doctrines and market factors206—may be sufficient to prevent corporate 
exploitation of informal dissolution as a means of avoiding future liability.  If 
shareholders lack the ability and/or inclination to initiate and control the means 
of corporate dissolution, then exposing them to extended liability to deter 
opportunistic dissolution is arguably unnecessary as a means of deterrence.  
Further, the possibility that temporally extended shareholder liability is of 
limited utility as a means of compensating future claimants—but imposes a 
high social cost on the vitality of equity investments—further militates against 
its use as a deterrent in Delaware’s dissolution scheme.  Ultimately, however, 
the viability of categorically limiting shareholder liability depends upon 
judicial recognition of an implied statutory duty for directors and the potential 
for successor liability as a means of deterring pre-dissolution liquidation. 
While Delaware’s dissolution statute enables either directors or 
shareholders to independently initiate dissolution,207 the modern status of 
equitable ownership in corporations arguably renders shareholder-initiated 
dissolution unlikely.208  The historical division of ownership from control 
isolates information and management in a comparatively small group of 
directors and officers.209  Thus, the modern shareholder is unlikely to possess 
sufficient knowledge of future corporate liabilities to initiate dissolution 
proceedings.210  Moreover, Section 275(c) requires written, unanimous consent 
 
 206. For a comprehensive analysis of the market, legal, and psychological factors that serve 
as a deterrent to corporate dissolution as a means avoiding future liability, see Mark J. Roe, 
Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1 (1986).  Ultimately, Roe argues that 
“[t]he managerial structure of the large public firm suggests that blitzkrieg liquidation is an 
unlikely counterpunch to mass tort onslaught.”  Id. at 29. 
 207. Tit. 8, § 275(a)–(c). 
 208. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 420 (1983) (citing Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1483 (1958)) 
(“Managers still are rarely displaced by voters; managers’ recommendations on fundamental 
corporate changes, amendments of by-laws, or other matters are routinely followed; shareholders’ 
proposals do well if they have 5 percent of the vote.  In those rare situations where a proxy fight 
for control develops, the insurgent’s chance for success is likely determined by the amount of 
shares he owns rather than by the force of his arguments.”); Roe, supra note 206, at 9 (observing 
that corporate shareholders are largely “scattered and uniformed” whereas managers have 
“substantial control over the firm”); see also 1 BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED 
CORPORATIONS §§ 2:6–29, at 23–34 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the various types of modern 
shareholders and why much shareholder action is largely responsive rather than initiative). 
 209. See Roe, supra note 206, at 28. 
 210. Id. (noting that the modern shareholder generally lacks access to information regarding 
the operation of corporate affairs). 
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among qualified stockholders to initiate dissolution without director action.211  
Given this requirement, it is unlikely that corporate shareholders could marshal 
the requisite votes to initiate dissolution as a means of avoiding future 
liabilities without revealing the apparently fraudulent motivation.212  Finally, 
individual investors are more likely to simply sell their shares in the face of 
potential future liabilities rather than initiate a proxy fight to achieve corporate 
dissolution.213 
In addition to these impediments to shareholder-initiated dissolution, 
Delaware’s dissolution statute and the realities of corporate governance 
suggest that directors have the ultimate choice as to the means by which the 
corporation will be wound up.  Under Section 278, the corporation is 
“continued, for the term of 3 years” as a “bod[y] corporate” to wind-up 
corporate affairs.214  This continuation of the corporate entity, as such, seems 
to imply that the directors will maintain their position and authority to dispose 
of corporate assets and provide for corporate claims.  Further, the commentary 
to Section 280 indicates the intent to create a “safe harbor” so that 
“directors . . . will not be held personally liable to unpaid claimants of the 
corporation for having improperly distributed assets.”215  This seems to suggest 
that at dissolution, directors rather than shareholders are responsible for 
selecting the means by which corporate assets are distributed.  In Lone Star 
Industries Inc. v. Redwine,216 the Fifth Circuit, construing Delaware law, 
observed that Section 278 “provides that the corporation itself may conduct 
winding up, presumably through its officers and directors.”217  The court 
further concluded that “the formal act of dissolution does not disturb the 
directors’ authority to determine the means by which winding up is to be 
accomplished.”218  Moreover, in In re RegO Co., the Delaware Court of 
Chancery, in construing the formal dissolution method under Sections 280 and 
281(a), noted that “[f]ollowing this procedure allows corporate directors to 
assure themselves that they have satisfied the corporation’s obligations to 
future claimants and that they will qualify for the protections afforded by 
Section 281(c).”219  These cases suggest that directors have the ability and 
 
 211. Tit. 8, § 275(c). 
 212. Cf. Roe, supra note 206, at 28 (asserting that fraudulent conveyances are at issue during 
liquidation). 
 213. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 208, at 404 (arguing that when shareholders’ 
shares are “under water” the shareholders lack incentive because their efforts will benefit 
creditors, not them). 
 214. Tit. 8, § 278. 
 215. S.B. 93, 134th Gen. Assemb. § 280 cmt. (Del. 1987). 
 216. 757 F.2d 1544 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 217. Id. at 1549. 
 218. Id. at 1550. 
 219. In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92, 97 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
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authority to select the method by which a dissolved corporation distributes its 
assets.220  Thus, it seems that the ultimate decision as to whether a dissolved 
corporation will wind up its affairs under the formal provisions of Sections 280 
and 281(a), or the informal provisions of Section 281(b) is within director, 
rather than shareholder, discretion.  Consequently, the imposition of 
temporally extended liability upon shareholders to deter opportunistic 
exploitation of the informal wind-up process may be of limited utility. 
Assuming that directors possess the ability to choose the means of 
corporate wind-up, it is likely that the possibility of personal directorial 
liability under informal dissolution may be sufficient to deter corporations 
from using the informal provisions of Section 281(b) as a means of avoiding 
future liability.  If the Delaware courts recognize that directorial 
noncompliance with Section 281(b) gives rise to personal liability, then 
directors have a personal incentive to eliminate this risk.  Consequently, if a 
corporation has potential future liabilities to tort claimants, directors have an 
incentive to utilize the safe harbor provided by formal dissolution under 
Sections 280 and 281(a).221  This, in turn, provides future claimants with 
greater protection, because formal dissolution requires judicial determination 
of the provisions of security necessary for the protection of future claimants.222  
So long as Delaware courts are willing to enforce a statutory duty of directors 
under Section 281(b),223 it will likely serve as a deterrent to the opportunistic 
use of informal wind-up procedures to avoid future liabilities. 
In addition to the potential for personal liability, commentators have noted 
the presence of other legal doctrines and market factors that may deter 
directors from dissolving a corporation to avoid future tort liabilities.224  While 
somewhat tenuous under Delaware case law, the doctrine of successor liability 
may be employed to deter directors from disposing of corporate assets and 
 
 220. In the case of closely held corporations where the shareholders often manage the firm’s 
business, Section 351(3) subjects such shareholders to the same liabilities as directors.  DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351(3) (2008).  Consequently, the shareholders of closely held corporations 
may not initiate corporation dissolution and avoid the statutory liabilities of directors under 
Section 281(b).  See id. 
 221. See In re RegO, 623 A.2d at 97 (“[R]eliance upon the mechanisms of Section 281(b) 
may present a risky situation . . . .  It is difficult to see the utility in preserving this risk. . . .  
Following [Section 281(a)] allows corporate directors to assure themselves . . . that they will 
qualify for the protections afforded by Section 281(c).”). 
 222. Tit. 8, § 280(c)(3). 
 223. See discussion supra pp. 1200–01 (discussing a statutory duty of directors). 
 224. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 206, at 30–38 (listing among market factors contract creditors 
and contingent claimants); Stilson, supra note 2, at 75–76 (noting that the trust fund doctrine, 
corporate dissolution statutes, fraudulent conveyance statutes, and successor liability theory have 
been utilized). 
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subsequently distributing the proceeds to shareholders.225  While there does not 
appear to be a reported decision in Delaware applying successor liability, the 
elements have been articulated in several unpublished lower court opinions.  In 
one such opinion, the Delaware Superior Court stated that “where avoidance of 
liability would be unjust,” Delaware law imposes liability under the “mere 
continuation of the predecessor corporation under a different name” theory—
that is, when the transferee is “dominated or controlled” by the transferor.226  
Other examples of situations where this liability may arise include contractual 
assumption of liability by the buyer, de facto merger or consolidation, or 
fraud.227  While not a complete bar to liability avoidance, the successor 
liability doctrine—if Delaware courts choose to adopt it—may be used to 
inhibit the ability of directors to liquidate a firm’s assets at dissolution in order 
to avoid making provisions for future tort claimants.  The potential for 
successor liability would arguably dissuade potential purchasers from 
acquiring a substantial portion of a dissolving firm’s assets.  In addition, the 
reticence of purchasers would likely force the corporation to sell its assets 
piecemeal, thereby reducing their value.228  In order for this theory to serve as 
a sufficient deterrent, however, Delaware courts would have to explicitly adopt 
it and be willing to apply it when necessary. 
Delaware’s fraudulent conveyance statutes may also be applied to further 
deter opportunistic asset distributions during dissolution.229  Under Section 
1304, a conveyance is fraudulent as to a future creditor (e.g., a future tort 
claimant) if it was made “[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any 
creditor.”230  While bona fide purchasers for value are protected from 
liability,231 directors or shareholders possessing knowledge of future liabilities 
may both be subject to liability for the value of the distributions.232  The 
applicability of these statutes is inherently limited, however, by the 
requirement that the plaintiff creditor prove actual fraud,233 the time limits 
 
 225. See Roe, supra note 206, at 31–32 (discussing the use of successor liability theory in 
general as a means of deterring mass tort liquidation). 
 226. Ross v. Desa Holdings Corp., No. 05C-05-013, 2008 WL 4899226, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 30, 2008). 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Roe, supra note 206, at 31–32. 
 229. The use of fraudulent conveyance statutes to deter opportunistic liquidation has been 
recommended and noted by many commentators.  See, e.g., id. at 33–34; Stilson, supra note 2, at 
75–76. 
 230. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1304(a) (2008). 
 231. Id. § 1308(a). 
 232. See id. §§ 1307(a)–(b), 1308(b). 
 233. See id. § 1304(a); see also Roe, supra note 206, at 20 (“The required demonstration of 
the conveyer’s actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud future creditors might sometimes defeat 
plaintiffs . . . .”). 
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within which claims must brought,234 and the protection afforded to bona fide 
purchasers.235 
Finally, in an article discussing corporate reaction to future tort liability, 
Professor Mark Roe has articulated a host of non-legal factors that deter 
opportunistic decisions by directors.236  According to Professor Roe, “the 
managerial structure of the modern corporation suggests that the liquidation 
response, although plausible, probably would not be common.” 237  Among the 
many factors serving as deterrents, Professor Roe notes managerial reluctance 
to end their own jobs and destroy their source of indemnification and the 
possibility of destroying their reputation in the future job market.238  Thus, in 
addition to the legal doctrines, there may be other plausible market factors that 
prevent directors from exploiting the informal wind-up procedures of Section 
281(b) to avoid future liabilities. 
It is therefore feasible for the Delaware General Assembly to categorically 
limit shareholder liability to three years after corporate dissolution, while 
simultaneously providing adequate protection to future tort claimants.  As 
noted by the court in Goldman Sachs, exposing shareholders to temporally 
extended post-dissolution liability may have deleterious consequences for 
equity investments in corporations.239  By imposing uncertainty upon 
dissolution distributions, extended shareholder liability limits the ability of 
shareholders to reinvest or otherwise use these distributions.240  In addition, 
temporally extended shareholder liability may be of only limited utility as a 
means of compensating future claimants, who may face significant difficulties 
and expenses in locating and obtaining jurisdiction over individual 
shareholders years after corporate dissolution.241 
The feasibility of categorically limiting post-dissolution liability, however, 
depends upon judicial recognition of both directorial power and liability during 
corporate dissolution.  If the shareholder incentive to utilize the formal wind-
up procedures under Sections 280 and 281(a) is removed, then the integrity of 
 
 234. Depending upon the nature of the fraudulent transfer, creditors generally must file suit 
between one to four years of the transfer, or, if later, within one year after the transfer was or 
reasonably could have been discovered.  See tit. 6, § 1309. 
 235. Id. § 1308(a). 
 236. Roe, supra note 206, at 58–59. 
 237. Id. at 57–58. 
 238. See id. at 57–59 (managerial reluctance and lost indemnification); id. at 23 (lost 
reputation). 
 239. Territory of the U.S. V.I. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d 760, 795–96 (Del. Ch. 
2007), aff’d, 956 A.2d 32 (Del. Super. 2008). 
 240. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 796. 
 241. Sarlitto, supra note 1, at 1052; Schnall, supra note 2, at 148; see also Goldman, Sachs & 
Co., 937 A.2d at 796 (noting inherent difficulties); In re Citadel Indus., 423 A.2d 500, 506 (Del. 
Ch. 1980) (“[T]he task would be enormous.”). 
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Delaware’s statutory scheme can only be preserved by confirming that 
directors alone may choose the means of corporate wind-up.  Further, 
Delaware courts must be willing to enforce a statutory duty for directors under 
Sections 281(b) and 281(c) to make reasonable provisions for future claimants 
if they choose informal wind-up.  By exposing directors to personal liability if 
they fail to provide adequate security during informal wind-up, the statutory 
scheme will incentivize the use of formal wind-up under Sections 280 and 
281(a) where a corporation has potential future liability.  This, in turn, will 
protect future claimants by providing both judicial determination of security 
provisions and the possibility of a guardian ad litem to protect their interests.242  
In addition, judicial use of a successor liability doctrine will provide an 
additional deterrent to directorial opportunism.  By potentially exposing 
transferees of a corporation’s assets to the transferor corporation’s liability, the 
successor liability doctrine will inhibit directorial ability to arrange a large 
disposition of corporate assets to avoid future liabilities.  Thus, while feasible, 
a categorical limitation of post-dissolution shareholder liability will require 
recognition of directorial power and liability at dissolution, and the potential 
use of additional judicial doctrines to deter opportunism.  Given the Delaware 
Court of Chancery’s apparent preference for limiting shareholder liability in 
Goldman Sachs,243 this solution may be the most favorable. 
CONCLUSION 
As initially conceived, Delaware’s statutory dissolution scheme protects 
and furthers both corporate law and tort law policy concerns.244  By providing 
corporations with a choice between formal wind-up under Sections 280 and 
281(a), and informal wind-up under Section 281(b), this scheme provides 
corporations with flexibility during dissolution.245  Further, by providing 
directors and shareholders with certain protection from personal liability if the 
corporation employs formal wind-up procedures, the scheme offers these 
parties certainty and facilitates the subsequent investment of dissolution 
distributions.246  These benefits, in turn, incentivize the use of formal 
dissolution,247 which thereby fulfills important tort law policy concerns.  Under 
formal dissolution, the Court of Chancery determines adequate provisions of 
security for current and future claimants, and may appoint a guardian ad litem 
to protect the interests of future claimants.248  Therefore, Delaware’s 
 
 242. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 280(c) (2008). 
 243. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 792–98. 
 244. Schnall, supra note 2, at 175. 
 245. See tit. 8, §§ 280–281(a); Schnall, supra note 2, at 167. 
 246. See tit. 8, § 281(c); Schnall, supra note 2, at 175. 
 247. See Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 799. 
 248. Tit. 8, § 280(c)(3). 
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dissolution scheme, as initially conceived, admirably balances traditionally 
competing policy concerns.249 
After Goldman Sachs, however, it may be necessary to modify existing 
judicial doctrines and re-interpret Delaware’s dissolution statute in order to 
both preserve the integrity of this system and provide shareholders with 
substantial protection from post-dissolution liability.  Given the current state of 
the law under Goldman Sachs, shareholders lack an incentive to initiate or 
approve of formal dissolution; they are equally protected from post-dissolution 
liability regardless of the method of wind-up the corporation employs.250  
Consequently, to enable corporations to choose between formal and informal 
dissolution, while simultaneously preventing opportunistic dissolution under 
the latter, the Delaware Courts of Chancery should employ three measures: 1) 
limit the power to choose the method of corporate dissolution solely to 
directors; 2) impose an implied statutory duty upon such directors to make 
reasonable provisions for future claims if they elect informal wind-up; and 3) 
utilize the doctrine of successor liability when necessary to avoid pre-
dissolution asset liquidation.  By vesting directors with the sole power to 
choose the method of corporate wind-up, and imposing a statutory duty under 
Section 281(b) to make adequate security provisions if they choose informal 
wind-up, the statutory scheme may be able to maintain the balance between 
corporate and tort law policy concerns.  This solution will protect shareholders 
regardless of the method of dissolution, but, by exposing directors to personal 
liability if they elect informal wind-up, it will deter directorial opportunism.  
However, the viability of this option requires the Delaware Court of Chancery 
to both confirm that only directors may choose the method of corporate wind-
up and recognize a statutory duty incumbent upon directors under Section 
281(b).  In addition, Delaware courts must be willing to utilize judicial 
doctrines like successor liability to further deter directorial exploitation of the 
informal wind-up provisions. 
Thus, it may be possible for Delaware General Corporation Law to achieve 
a new balance between corporate and tort law policy concerns regarding 
corporate dissolution, and protect shareholders from post-dissolution liability.  
By 1) limiting the power to choose the method of corporate wind-up solely to 
directors, 2) imposing an implied statutory duty upon such directors to make 
reasonable provisions for future claims if they elect informal wind-up under 
Section 281(b), and 3) making ready use of successor liability to avoid pre-
dissolution asset liquidation, the Delaware Court of Chancery may be able to 
protect corporate shareholders and claimants alike.  Under these conditions, 
Delaware’s statutory dissolution scheme still provides directors with the 
flexibility of choosing between two different methods of corporate wind-up 
 
 249. Schnall, supra note 2, at 175. 
 250. See Goldman, Sachs & Co., 937 A.2d at 764. 
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while simultaneously limiting shareholder liability for post-dissolution 
distributions to three years regardless of the chosen method of dissolution.  In 
addition, future tort claimants would be protected insofar as the directors of 
corporations with potential future liabilities would have a personal incentive to 
utilize the judicially supervised formal wind-up procedures under Sections 280 
and 281(a).  Under these provisions, foreseeable tort claimants are entitled to 
judicially approved security and, under certain circumstances, may obtain a 
guardian ad litem at the corporation’s expense to protect their interests.251 
Delaware’s dissolution statute thus provides an admirable model for 
corporate dissolution.  By providing directors and shareholders with the 
flexibility and protection from liability during and after corporate dissolution, 
while simultaneously protecting the interests of present and foreseeable 
corporate claimants, Delaware’s dissolution statute adequately balances 
disparate policy concerns.  With the implementation of some of the changes 
recommended in this Comment, Delaware’s statutory scheme may serve as a 
model for other states’ corporate dissolution schemes. 
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